Summary of Key Spanish Employment Law Judgments: November 2026
Last updated: 16 November 2026
Eduardo Ortega Figueiral
Jorge Barbat Soler
Esther Vicente García
Raül Sala Cuberta
1. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Subcontracting in the delivery sector is lawful where the contractor retains effective direction of its employees, assumes the business risk and operates through technically independent technological environments.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Genuine business autonomy. The contractor retains the effective organisation, direction and control of its delivery workers through its own traffic management team.
■ Independent technology. The sublicensing of the technological tools and the technical impossibility for the principal company to access the contractor’s systems directly weigh against a finding of unlawful supply of labour (cesión ilegal de trabajadores).
■ Business risk and own resources. Contractual penalties and the contractor’s own organisational structure demonstrate genuine subcontracting, without the principal company’s branding altering that conclusion.
Although the licences for the delivery management software (Yuso) and the Driver App belonged to Just-Eat, Just-Eat licensed their use to Fleet under a sublicence agreement in return for an annual fee. It was established that the tools operated independently and that direct access by the principal company to the contractor’s systems was technically impossible.
Fleet also provided its own corporate structure and management. In addition, it had its own traffic management team, comprising coordinators and traffic managers, which organised shifts, allocated orders and issued direct instructions to delivery workers. Just-Eat personnel did not communicate instructions or directives directly to Fleet’s workforce.
Although Just Eat provided Fleet each week with a forecast of order volumes broken down by day and time slot, Fleet’s traffic managers determined the number of delivery workers required, adapting staffing levels to the actual volume of work arising during the week. It was also established that Fleet assumed genuine business risk, as the commercial agreement provided for penalties and deductions from invoicing in the event of failures regarding delivery times, quality or damaged goods.
In this context, the fact that delivery workers used clothing and food delivery bags bearing the Just-Eat logo did not support a finding of unlawful supply of labour, since this arose from a separate marketing and advertising agreement for which the principal company paid consideration.
Accordingly, the arrangement constitutes lawful subcontracting of delivery services. Those services are autonomous and distinct from Just-Eat’s principal activity of intermediation and order management. Just-Eat’s involvement is limited to coordination and the monitoring of the quality and efficiency of the service provided by the subcontractor.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment of 9 September 2026 (Appeal No. 137/2025).
2. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Paid leave for the hospitalisation of family members is not subject to an aggregate annual limit but arises independently each time a new qualifying event occurs.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ A separate entitlement for each qualifying event. Each new hospitalisation, serious illness or need for care gives rise to a separate five-day paid leave entitlement.
■ No aggregate annual limit. Article 37.3(b) of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores, ET) does not establish a maximum of five days per calendar year.
■ Discharge from hospital does not terminate the leave. Leave may continue where home rest or an effective need for care persists.
The issue concerns the interpretation of the paid leave entitlement established in Article 37.3(b) of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores, ET) in cases involving hospitalisation, serious illness or the need to care for family members or persons living in the same household. The dispute arose following the reform introduced by Royal Decree-Law 5/2023 (Real Decreto-ley 5/2023), which increased the duration of the leave from two to five days in order to implement Directive (EU) 2019/1158.
The company argued that the leave should be limited to a maximum of five days per calendar year, on the basis that Directive (EU) 2019/1158 provides carers with five working days of leave per year. The Court rejected that interpretation, finding that EU legislation merely establishes a minimum level of protection and allows Member States to provide more favourable rights for employees.
Under Spanish employment law, the leave retains its traditional character as an entitlement linked to each qualifying event. Accordingly, each new hospitalisation, illness or situation requiring care gives rise to a new entitlement to leave, with no express annual cap. Indeed, where the Spanish legislature has intended to establish annual limits, it has done so expressly, as in the case of force majeure leave governed by Article 37.9 ET.
Discharge from hospital does not automatically terminate the entitlement. The purpose of the leave is to ensure that effective care can be provided to the family member concerned. Consequently, where a medical condition continues to require home rest or assistance following discharge, the employee may continue to take leave until the full five-day statutory entitlement has been exhausted.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment of 25 September 2026 (Appeal No. 135/2025).
3. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
The obligation to implement protective measures against carcinogenic agents is triggered by the mere fact that an employee is exposed to diesel fumes.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Exposure and contamination are distinct concepts. Exposure arises from contact with the agent, whereas contamination concerns the risk of carrying that agent beyond the workplace.
■ Protective measures are mandatory where a risk exists. Even a very low risk requires suitable work clothing, separate storage facilities for work and personal clothing, and employer-managed laundering of workwear.
■ Personal hygiene time is triggered by exposure alone. The hygiene time provided for in Article 6.2 of Royal Decree 665/1997 (Real Decreto 665/1997) does not require evidence of any additional contamination risk.
Occupational exposure of employees at vehicle inspection centres (ITV stations) to diesel fumes creates a risk, even if very low, of contamination of their clothing and skin. This gives rise to an obligation on the employer to provide suitable workwear, separate storage facilities for work clothes and personal clothes, and to assume responsibility for laundering and decontaminating work clothing.
The dispute arose at vehicle inspection centres in the province of Barcelona, where the works council sought recognition that the workforce was exposed to diesel fumes, classified as a carcinogenic agent, and requested that the company be required to implement the preventive measures laid down in Royal Decree 665/1997. On appeal, the Spanish Supreme Court clarified when a «risk of contamination» exists and how the personal hygiene and individual protection obligations under Article 6 of Royal Decree 665/1997 apply.
The Court clearly distinguishes between «exposure» and «contamination». Exposure refers to the presence of the chemical agent in the workplace and contact between that agent and the employee through routes capable of producing harmful effects, principally inhalation or dermal exposure. Contamination, by contrast, concerns the possibility that occupational exposure may extend beyond the workplace itself, for example through work clothing that may become an independent source of exposure, including for third parties outside the workplace.
The factor triggering the employer’s obligation is therefore not the existence of an incident of contamination that has already occurred, but the existence of a sufficiently established risk that contamination may occur.
On this basis, the Spanish Supreme Court accepted as an established fact that occupational exposure to diesel engine emissions creates a risk, albeit very low, of contamination of clothing and skin. The employer must therefore provide appropriate workwear, provide separate storage facilities for work clothing and personal clothing, and assume responsibility for laundering and decontaminating the work clothing. Employees must not be permitted to take such workwear home.
These measures, linked to Articles 6.1 and 6.3 of Royal Decree 665/1997, apply where there is a risk of contamination. The Court therefore upheld the first-instance ruling requiring compliance with those measures, as the relevant risk had been established.
The personal hygiene time regulated by Article 6.2 of Royal Decree 665/1997, however, operates on a different basis. The triggering condition is simply that employees are identified as being «exposed» to a carcinogenic agent, without any need to demonstrate an additional contamination risk.
Exposure alone is sufficient for the employer to be required to count as working time up to ten minutes before the meal break and a further ten minutes before the end of the working day for personal hygiene purposes. The Spanish Supreme Court therefore confirms that, once employees are recognised as being exposed to diesel fumes, this measure becomes automatically enforceable.
Finally, in response to the company’s argument that the lower court had conflated exposure and contamination, the Spanish Supreme Court held that the original ruling merely presumed that exposure may also give rise to a risk of contamination, placing the burden on the employer to prove otherwise.
Since the employer is responsible for identifying and assessing occupational risks, the principle of evidential availability justifies placing the onus probandi concerning the absence of contamination risk on the company. Although the Supreme Court identified a degree of insufficient reasoning in the assessment of the expert evidence submitted by the company, that issue had not been raised procedurally as a ground for nullity. It therefore did not alter the central outcome: the employer’s obligation to implement hygiene and protective measures arising from exposure to carcinogenic agents was upheld, even where measured levels were below the applicable occupational exposure limit.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 718/2026 of 16 September 2026 (Appeal No. 191/2025).
4. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Regional collective bargaining: the reform of Article 84 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute does not require the establishment of new bargaining committees.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ A right, not an obligation. Article 84.3 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET) permits regional collective agreements to be negotiated but does not require new bargaining committees to be established.
■ An active national bargaining unit. Ongoing negotiations for the national collective agreement justify the employers’ associations not participating simultaneously in a competing regional sectoral bargaining process.
■ No infringement of trade union rights. A legally justified refusal by the employers does not breach freedom of association or the right to collective bargaining.
The Spanish Supreme Court considered whether the refusal by employers’ organisations in the chemical sector to establish a bargaining committee for a regional collective agreement in the Basque Country infringed the freedom of association of the trade unions promoting the negotiations. The dispute arose following the reform of Article 84.3 ET introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/2024 (Real Decreto-ley 2/2024), which strengthens the priority of regional collective agreements over national-level agreements.
The Social Chamber held that the reform does not create an obligation to negotiate regional collective agreements or require the establishment of new territorial bargaining units. Article 84.3 ET uses permissive wording, «may negotiate», and therefore establishes a legal possibility rather than a duty to constitute a regional bargaining committee.
The Spanish Supreme Court also emphasised that the chemical sector already had an active national bargaining unit and that negotiations were under way for the national collective agreement that would replace the previous agreement. In those circumstances, the employers’ associations were already complying with their duty to negotiate under Article 89 ET and could not be required simultaneously to participate in a competing regional sectoral negotiation.
The employers’ refusal to establish the regional bargaining committee was therefore legally justified and did not constitute an infringement of freedom of association or the right to collective bargaining.
In summary, the priority afforded to regional collective agreements by the 2024 reform does not automatically create new bargaining units and does not allow organisations with bargaining standing to be compelled to negotiate a regional agreement where an active national bargaining unit already exists and the relevant national agreement is in the process of renewal.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber (Full Court). Judgment No. 751/2026 of 23 September 2026.
5. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
The collective agreement for road freight transport in the province of Pontevedra may include courier services within its functional scope.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Freedom to define the scope. A transport collective agreement may include courier services where there is sufficient functional similarity and the Spanish rules on bargaining standing and concurrent collective agreements are respected.
■ No independent bargaining structure. The absence of an active statutory collective agreement for courier services supports coverage of the activity through collective bargaining in the transport sector.
■ Valid but not definitive inclusion. Courier services may remain covered while no independent bargaining framework exists, without preventing a specific collective agreement from being negotiated in the future.
As a general rule under Spanish collective bargaining law, collective agreements have the scope agreed by the negotiating parties. However, that freedom is not absolute. It is subject to compliance with the rules on standing to negotiate, the requirement that bargaining units be reasonable, the agreements governing bargaining structures under Article 83.2 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET), and the rule governing concurrent collective agreements in Article 84 ET.
Although road freight transport and courier services are clearly different and not entirely homogeneous activities, the Social Chamber found sufficient functional similarity between them to permit their inclusion within the same bargaining unit.
It was particularly significant that there was currently no agreement of the type contemplated in Article 83.2 ET specifically defining the collective bargaining structure for the courier sector, and that sector-specific bargaining was effectively inactive because the most recent national courier agreement in force was non-statutory (extraestatutario).
Against that background, the Second General Agreement for Road Freight Transport Companies (II Acuerdo General para las Empresas de Transporte de Mercancías por Carretera) includes within its scope courier activities requiring administrative authorisation. Its Article 6 also provides that the General Agreement is directly binding and must be observed in sectoral transport negotiations, without preventing broader functional scopes.
In particular, the General Agreement provides that where, as a result of bargaining autonomy, the functional scope of a transport-sector collective agreement extends beyond the scope contemplated by the General Agreement itself, «the adaptation of the new collective bargaining framework to the provisions of this Agreement shall be understood as referring exclusively to the rules applicable to companies engaged in road freight transport and to their ancillary and complementary activities, including courier and logistics services».
This wording reflects an approach of gradual adaptation of bargaining units and does not preclude certain collective agreements from encompassing courier services, even where such services do not require administrative authorisation.
In the Supreme Court’s view, this provision shows that transport-sector negotiators intended to leave open the possibility of including courier activities within transport-sector collective agreements.
It also reflects awareness of the relative uncertainty surrounding the sector and the practical need to provide collective bargaining coverage through transport agreements.
The Social Chamber therefore held that, until an appropriate statutory collective bargaining framework specifically covering the courier sector is established, nothing prevents such activity from being regulated by a transport-sector collective agreement, provided that the minimum degree of functional similarity required to make that inclusion reasonable exists.
Accordingly, the Collective Agreement for the transport sector in the province of Pontevedra for 2023 to 2026 cannot be declared unlawful merely because its functional scope includes ancillary and complementary courier activities. This is without prejudice to the possibility of a specific collective agreement for courier services being negotiated in the same geographical area in the future, whose relationship with other agreements would then have to be determined in accordance with the general rules on concurrent collective agreements and the Second General Agreement for Road Freight Transport Companies.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 525/2026 of 29 May 2026 (Appeal No. 113/2025).
6. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Temporary incapacity arising from an accident at work. Employer liability for failure to comply with Social Security contribution obligations: five months of unpaid contributions, without further circumstances, are insufficient to establish serious, persistent and wilful non-compliance.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Not every failure to pay contributions triggers employer liability. Liability is transferred to the employer only where non-payment demonstrates a definitive, voluntary, serious and persistent failure to comply with the obligation to pay Social Security contributions.
■ Overall assessment with no fixed time threshold. The duration of the non-payment must be considered together with its continuity, proportionality and other circumstances demonstrating a deliberate breakdown of the contributory relationship.
■ Five months are not sufficient in themselves. In the absence of other evidence of persistent non-compliance, liability for the benefit arising from the accident at work remains with the relevant collaborating entity.
In the absence of implementing regulations under Article 167 of the Spanish General Social Security Act (Ley General de la Seguridad Social, LGSS), cases such as this continue to be governed by Articles 94, 95 and 96 of Decree 907/1966.
Article 94 of Decree 907/1966 provides for liability «from the second month following» expiry of the statutory payment deadline and prevents late payment from having a discharging effect unless a deferral or payment by instalments has been granted. In the absence of implementing regulations, this automatic or objective liability was replaced by Spanish case law with a proportionality assessment, beginning with the Supreme Court Judgment of 8 May 1997 (Appeal No. 3824/1996) and consolidated by the Supreme Court Judgment, Full Social Chamber, of 1 February 2000 (Appeal No. 694/1999).
The resulting principle is that not every failure to pay contributions gives rise to employer liability. Liability arises only where the nature and circumstances of the default demonstrate «definitive and voluntary» non-compliance reflecting a deliberate refusal to comply with the obligation to contribute. This is to be distinguished from occasional, sporadic or temporary non-compliance, typically arising from cash-flow difficulties, in which case liability remains with the entity covering the relevant contingency, namely the mutual insurance entity (mutua colaboradora con la Seguridad Social).
The case law subsequently clarified how this general principle applies to occupational contingencies. In relation to benefits arising from occupational contingencies, for which the LGSS provides that «no prior contribution periods shall be required», the Court reiterated that a distinction must still be drawn between temporary, occasional or involuntary failures and definitive, voluntary or persistent failures demonstrating an employer’s intention not to comply with its contribution obligations.
In the former case, liability for payment of the benefit rests with the managing or collaborating entity. In the latter, liability falls on the employer, with subsidiary liability on the Spanish National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, INSS).
Any unpaid contributions must, in all cases, pre-date the accident at work. Defaults arising after the accident are not relevant for determining liability. The Social Chamber has also held that the mutual insurance entity is required to advance payment of the benefit under the Spanish principle of automatic entitlement to benefits (principio de automaticidad de las prestaciones), while retaining the right subsequently to recover the amount from the employer and, if the employer is insolvent, from the INSS and the Social Security Treasury as subsidiary guarantors.
As regards the duration of the failure to pay contributions, the Spanish Supreme Court has not established any fixed «threshold» beyond which an accumulation of unpaid months automatically gives rise to employer liability. There is no fixed rule determining when repeated non-payment remains occasional, giving rise only to enforcement action and the corresponding penalty, and when it becomes «persistent» or «wilful» non-compliance sufficient to transfer liability to the employer.
This is logical because employer liability depends not only on the fact and duration of the contribution default, but also on other factors capable of demonstrating deliberate non-compliance. In this case, five months of unpaid contributions, without anything further, were insufficient to establish serious and persistent non-compliance with the employer’s Spanish Social Security obligations.
Something more had to be demonstrated: that the duration, continuity and proportionality of the default in the context of the overall contribution history, together with the other relevant circumstances, showed a genuine voluntary breakdown of the contributory relationship.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment of 6 October 2026 (Appeal No. 1074/2025).
7. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Reducing remote working from 100% to 75% for employees with disabilities following expiry of the previous agreement does not constitute a substantial modification of working conditions under Spanish employment law.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Expiry of the previous agreement. As the remote-working arrangement expired on 31 December 2024, the new policy did not alter terms and conditions that remained in force.
■ No substantial modification. The reduction in remote working from 100% to 75% constitutes a new framework introduced after expiry of the previous arrangement, rather than a substantial modification of working conditions (modificación sustancial de condiciones de trabajo).
■ A reasoned and procedurally consistent judgment. The Spanish National Court remained within the scope of the dispute and adequately explained why the earlier ruling concerning other companies in the group was distinguishable.
The reduction in remote working for employees with disabilities at a telephone services company, from 100% to 75% of working time with effect from 2025, reached the Spanish Supreme Court as a collective dispute concerning an alleged substantial modification of working conditions (modificación sustancial de condiciones de trabajo).
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the claim and focused primarily on procedural issues: whether the Spanish National Court (Audiencia Nacional) had exceeded the scope of the dispute, contradicted itself or failed adequately to explain its conclusion that there had been no genuine modification of existing conditions, but instead a new remote-working model following expiry of the previous arrangement.
The analysis combines the rules governing appeals in the Spanish social jurisdiction under Article 207 of the Labour Jurisdiction Act (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Social, LRJS) with the constitutional requirements of effective judicial protection and reasoned judgments under Articles 24 and 120.3 of the Spanish Constitution (Constitución Española, CE), together with the rules on consistency of judicial decisions under the Organic Law on the Judiciary (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, LOPJ) and the Civil Procedure Act (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, LEC).
An important earlier decision also formed part of the background. A previous Audiencia Nacional judgment concerning other companies within the same corporate group had declared void the unilateral introduction of a less favourable remote-working policy for employees with disabilities, assessed under Article 8 of the Remote Working Act (Ley de Trabajo a Distancia, LTD). The Spanish Supreme Court took that precedent into account but distinguished it: the proceedings against the company now before the Court had been withdrawn in the earlier case and, in addition, the remote-working arrangement at issue here had an express expiry date contained in the agreement itself.
The first ground of appeal alleged an error in the assessment of evidence under Article 207(d) LRJS, relying on an alleged contradiction between the established facts summarising the earlier group judgment and the legal reasoning denying the existence of a substantial modification at the defendant company.
The Supreme Court recalled, however, that factual review on appeal requires the appellant to identify the fact sought to be amended, propose alternative wording and base the proposed correction on documentary evidence contained in the proceedings. None of those requirements was met because the trade union was not seeking to correct the factual record but rather to challenge the consistency of the Court’s reasoning.
The ground of appeal was therefore rejected. Nor was there any internal contradiction: the established fact simply described the outcome of another set of proceedings, whereas the legal reasoning analysed the specific remote-working policy of the company involved in the present dispute.
The second set of arguments alleged an extra petitum ruling and insufficient reasoning, relying on Article 207(e) LRJS and Spanish constitutional case law concerning decisions going beyond the relief sought. The trade union had requested that the decision to reduce the remote-working percentage for employees with disabilities be declared void. The Audiencia Nacional, however, relied on a key fact: the previous agreement expressly provided that it would remain in force only until 31 December 2024.
From that date, the agreed framework ceased to exist and the company adopted a new policy taking effect on 1 January 2025. On that basis, the Court concluded that the company had not altered conditions that were still in force but had instead established a different framework after expiry of the previous arrangement.
The Supreme Court held that this reasoning remained within the scope of the dispute and introduced no extraneous issues. It therefore rejected the allegation of procedural inconsistency and held that the judgment was adequately reasoned.
The resulting principle is clear: the Audiencia Nacional sufficiently explained why the employer’s decision did not constitute a substantial modification of working conditions under Spanish employment law and why the previous ruling concerning other companies within the group could not automatically be applied to the defendant in the present proceedings.
The Spanish Supreme Court therefore dismissed all grounds of appeal, upheld the first-instance judgment in full and declared it final, with no order as to costs.
The reduction of remote working from 100% to 75% for employees with disabilities following expiry of the previous agreement therefore does not constitute a substantial modification of working conditions.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 703/2026 of 9 September 2026 (Appeal No. 203/2025).
8. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
The statutory exclusion of employment status does not apply to a driver providing ancillary transport services to a company using his own vehicle weighing less than 3.5 tonnes.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ 3.5-tonne threshold. Providing one’s own vehicle excludes employment status only where the vehicle exceeds that maximum authorised weight and becomes the principal element of the activity.
■ Ancillary private transport. The exception in Article 1.3(g) of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET) requires commercial vehicles used for public transport services and does not automatically apply to internal transport.
■ Subordination and working for another’s account prevail. Working shifts, instructions, training and use of the company’s facilities support classification of the relationship as an employment relationship under Spanish employment law.
The relationship loses its employment status only where the worker provides a vehicle of his own with a maximum authorised weight exceeding 3.5 tonnes, so that the equipment provided becomes the principal element of the activity.
The mere fact that the worker provides the vehicle is not sufficient to exclude employment status where the vehicle does not exceed the relevant 3.5-tonne threshold. Such vehicles fall within ancillary private transport and outside the statutory exception in Article 1.3(g) ET.
The engagement of drivers by companies to carry out their own private activity, as distinct from providing public freight transport services to third parties, only ceases to be an employment relationship where the driver provides a vehicle owned by him with a maximum authorised weight exceeding 3.5 tonnes. In those circumstances, the provision of equipment assumes sufficient importance to become the predominant element over the personal provision of labour. That is not the case where the threshold is not reached.
The Spanish Supreme Court focuses on the significance of the vehicle in light of the requirement for an administrative transport authorisation. It also emphasises that the exceptional rule in Article 1.3(g) ET requires the transport to be carried out «using commercial vehicles for public service». Accordingly, a sensu contrario, the statutory conditions for exclusion are not met where the vehicles are not used for public transport services.
The Social Chamber explains that the employment or commercial nature of the relationship involving an individual engaged as self-employed, who owns a vehicle with a maximum authorised weight of more than 2 tonnes but less than 3.5 tonnes and provides transport services for a company predominantly within the company’s industrial premises using private roads, with only incidental use of public roads, does not depend solely on the fact that the driver provides the vehicle.
In this case, the Court confirmed the existence of an employment relationship between the company and the owner of a van used to transport materials within the company’s facilities, a closed site containing approximately 25 kilometres of private roads. The fact that the driver supplied the vehicle did not displace the Spanish employment-law indicators of working for another’s account (ajenidad) and subordination or dependence (dependencia).
The predominant service, namely internal transport, was exempt from the administrative authorisation requirement. The driver worked the same shifts as the company’s employees, received instructions concerning absences, underwent training in the same way as other members of staff and used the company’s resources and facilities to carry out the activity.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 714/2026 of 15 September 2026 (Appeal No. 2954/2025).
9. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
An employee formally designated to perform occupational risk prevention duties retains the right to choose between reinstatement and statutory compensation where the dismissal is declared unfair (despido improcedente), even if the employee represents the company on the Health and Safety Committee.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Statutory protection for designated employees. An employee formally appointed to carry out preventive activities benefits from the specific safeguards provided under Article 30.4 of the Spanish Occupational Risk Prevention Act (Ley de Prevención de Riesgos Laborales, LPRL) and Article 56.4 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET).
■ The choice of remedy lies with the employee. Where the dismissal is declared unfair (despido improcedente), the employee may choose between reinstatement and statutory compensation, with entitlement to back pay (salarios de tramitación).
■ Objective protection. There is no need to prove that the dismissal was motivated by the employee’s preventive duties, and representing the employer on the Health and Safety Committee does not remove the statutory protection.
The Spanish Supreme Court considered who is entitled to choose between reinstatement and statutory compensation when an employee formally designated by the employer to perform occupational risk prevention duties is unfairly dismissed. The employee was responsible for the Occupational Risk Prevention and Safety Service at a hospital and was also a member of the Health and Safety Committee as an employer representative.
The company dismissed the employee on disciplinary grounds for breach of contractual good faith and loss of trust, following his involvement in the receipt of documentation that was subsequently used in civil proceedings. The Social Court (Juzgado de lo Social) rejected the claim that the dismissal was null and void (despido nulo), but declared it unfair (despido improcedente) and held that the company was entitled to choose between reinstatement and statutory compensation. The relevant High Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia) upheld that decision.
The appeal before the Spanish Supreme Court no longer concerned whether the dismissal was unfair, but exclusively which party was entitled to exercise the statutory option. The employee argued that, as the person responsible for the occupational risk prevention service, he fell within Article 30.4 LPRL. That provision grants formally designated employees certain safeguards applicable to workers’ representatives and expressly refers to Article 56.4 ET.
The Social Chamber accepted that argument. It distinguished between the different categories of individuals involved in occupational risk prevention and stressed that employees expressly designated by the employer to perform preventive activities enjoy, by operation of Spanish law, the guarantees established in Articles 68(a), 68(b), 68(c) and 56.4 ET.
Those guarantees include the right of the employee, rather than the employer, to choose the statutory consequence where a dismissal is declared unfair. Accordingly, the designated employee may choose between reinstatement and the statutory compensation for unfair dismissal.
The protection does not require proof that the dismissal was caused by the performance of preventive duties. The Court held that the guarantee applies objectively by virtue of the employee’s status as a formally designated employee. Nor is that protection removed because the employee represents the employer on the Health and Safety Committee: that representation is not the source of the statutory protection, which derives from the employee’s formal designation to perform occupational risk prevention duties.
The Spanish Supreme Court therefore upheld the appeal in part and held that the employee was entitled to choose between reinstatement and statutory compensation. It also ordered the company to pay the corresponding back pay (salarios de tramitación), irrespective of the option ultimately chosen, from the date of dismissal until notification of the judgment or until the employee obtained alternative employment at an earlier date.
From a practical perspective under Spanish employment law, the judgment highlights the importance of checking, before implementing a dismissal, whether the employee has been formally designated to perform occupational risk prevention duties. Such designation alters the ordinary statutory consequences of an unfair dismissal under the Estatuto de los Trabajadores: the choice between reinstatement and compensation is transferred from the employer to the employee and the employer may also face additional liability for salarios de tramitación.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 743/2026 of 22 September 2026 (Appeal No. 384/2025).
10. SPANISH SUPREME COURT (TRIBUNAL SUPREMO)
Dismissal of an employee who was a victim of gender-based violence held null and void after the company became aware of the complaint, was called to give evidence and failed to substantiate the alleged decline in performance.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Automatic nullity requires the exercise of specific statutory rights. Being a victim of gender-based violence does not, in itself, trigger the objective protection under Article 55.5 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET).
■ There was prima facie evidence of discrimination. The employer’s knowledge of the complaint, the employee’s temporary incapacity associated with emotional symptoms and the proximity of the dismissal shifted the burden of proof.
■ The absence of justification resulted in a null and void dismissal. As the alleged decline in performance was not established, the employee was entitled to reinstatement, back pay and EUR 10,000 in compensation for non-material damage.
An employee who headed the marketing department of a 3D design and printing company reported her former partner for gender-based violence, began treatment with specialist services, went on temporary incapacity leave due to emotional symptoms and was dismissed shortly afterwards for an alleged voluntary decline in performance that the company did not even attempt to prove.
Against that background, the Spanish Supreme Court did more than declare the dismissal null and void (despido nulo). It regarded the sequence of events as consistent evidence of discrimination linked to the employee’s status as a victim of gender-based violence and awarded, in addition to reinstatement and back pay, EUR 10,000 in compensation for non-material damage.
The Court distinguished between two forms of protection. First, the mere fact of being a victim of gender-based violence is not sufficient to trigger the automatic nullity provided for in Article 55.5 ET. That objective protection applies where the dismissal is connected with the exercise of specific rights associated with that status, including judicial protection, employment-related protective measures or comprehensive social assistance.
Second, where those specific rights have not been exercised, protection against dismissal operates through the general Spanish rules on discrimination and infringement of fundamental rights. This requires prior evidence capable of supporting an inference of discrimination and, where such evidence exists, triggers the reversal of the burden of proof under Article 181.2 of the Labour Jurisdiction Act (LRJS).
The judgment emphasises that gender-based violence, viewed in isolation and independently of any internal or employment-related judicial claim, does not in itself constitute sufficient evidence of discrimination. It is a circumstance arising in the employee’s private sphere that may have no immediate impact on her professional life.
However, it becomes relevant evidence when combined with other circumstances showing that the employer perceives the situation as a potential source of «problems», whether because of its emotional impact on the employee or because of the consequences of the criminal proceedings, provided that the employer is aware of those circumstances.
In this case, the Court relied on three factors: the complaint of gender-based violence and the employee’s receipt of specialist support; her temporary incapacity linked to emotional symptoms; and the employer’s knowledge of the criminal proceedings, evidenced by the fact that the company administrator had been summoned as a witness only a few days before the dismissal.
Together with the complete absence of evidence supporting the alleged decline in performance, those circumstances established a prima facie case placing discriminatory motivation within the realm of probability and shifting the burden to the employer to provide an objective and reasonable justification for its decision. It failed to do so.
The Spanish Supreme Court therefore held that the dismissal was null and void (despido nulo) for infringement of fundamental rights and ordered reinstatement, payment of back pay (salarios de tramitación) and EUR 10,000 in compensation.
Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 757/2026 of 29 September 2026 (Appeal No. 2681/2025).
11. SPANISH NATIONAL COURT (AUDIENCIA NACIONAL)
Collective dismissal held null and void after employee representatives with the highest levels of unassigned time were selected without adequate objective justification.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Enhanced protection for employee representatives. Their inclusion in a collective dismissal requires particularly rigorous, objective and individualised justification.
■ Unassigned time depends on the employer. Hours spent without an allocated project cannot automatically be attributed to the employee or, in themselves, constitute a legitimate selection criterion.
■ A ranking is insufficient. Selecting employee representatives on the basis of unexplained unproductive hours infringes freedom of association and renders the collective dismissal null and void.
The decision emphasises that an employee’s period of availability without an assigned project depends on the employer’s allocation of work and that basing the dismissal of employee representatives on a mere «ranking» of unproductive hours, without objective explanation, infringes freedom of association.
The company provided objective data, but those data were insufficient to justify the dismissal of employees who were legal representatives of the workforce (representantes legales de los trabajadores), because that status requires enhanced evidence establishing the grounds for termination. Given the close connection between their representative status and the exercise of freedom of association, a termination affecting those employees must be examined with particular rigour, as it may restrict or eliminate trade union activity within the company.
The number of hours accumulated while unassigned cannot be considered in isolation. Although the representatives had the highest volume of unproductive hours and their figures were significantly higher than those of other dismissed employees in the same situation, quantitative analysis alone was insufficient to establish a legitimate objective reason unrelated to the exercise of trade union activity.
The judgment notes that the employee’s unassigned status does not arise from the employee’s conduct, actions or duties, but from the company’s failure to allocate that employee to specific projects.
Against that background, the Audiencia Nacional criticised the company’s attempt to justify the representatives’ prolonged periods without project allocation by relying on an internal document prepared by the company itself and not accepted by the trade unions. That document referred to alleged redeployment efforts without sufficient supporting evidence or verifiable information concerning their number, content or effectiveness.
As the Spanish Labour Inspectorate (Inspección de Trabajo) had also noted, no objective information was provided explaining why those employees had remained unassigned to projects for such long periods. Nor were individual assessments produced to explain why those employees, rather than others in a similar position, had accumulated the greatest number of unproductive hours.
The company took into account all periods of unassigned time, including periods arising before the main project ended, constructed a form of «ranking» and selected for dismissal the employee representatives at the top of that list. There was no clear causal link with the loss of the contract and no specific and proportionate justification for their selection.
Since the termination decision was therefore based on an accumulation of objectively unexplained unassigned time disproportionately affecting employee representatives, the Court found an infringement of freedom of association. This rendered the collective dismissal null and void and entitled the affected employees to return to their positions with the statutory consequences associated with a null and void dismissal under Spanish employment law.
Spanish National Court (Audiencia Nacional), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 129/2026 of 13 July 2026 (Proceedings No. 19/2026).
12. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ARAGON (TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DE ARAGÓN)
Temporary incapacity following breast implant replacement is covered by the Spanish Social Security system where the procedure is required because of pathological complications rather than voluntary cosmetic surgery.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ The initial cosmetic procedure is not determinative. A voluntary cosmetic operation may subsequently give rise to pathological complications protected by the Spanish Social Security system.
■ There must be an impairment of health. Implant rupture, periprosthetic fluid and mastalgia mean that the replacement procedure constitutes treatment for a common illness.
■ Protected temporary incapacity. Where medical treatment is required and the employee is genuinely unable to work, temporary incapacity benefit (prestación de incapacidad temporal) is payable during recovery.
Not every breast surgery procedure of cosmetic origin can be regarded as voluntary for the purpose of excluding any resulting period of temporary incapacity (incapacidad temporal) from Spanish Social Security protection. Purely cosmetic surgery undertaken voluntarily and unrelated to an accident, illness or congenital malformation falls outside the public healthcare system’s portfolio of services and therefore does not give rise to entitlement to temporary incapacity benefit.
However, where the procedure ceases to be a matter of cosmetic choice and instead becomes necessary because of a significant complication or secondary effect, such as deterioration of breast implants caused by intracapsular rupture and accumulation of periprosthetic fluid, replacement surgery may fall within the scope of protected temporary incapacity, provided that the requirements of Article 169 of the Spanish General Social Security Act (LGSS) are satisfied.
Following Spanish Supreme Court case law, the Social Chamber notes that the Social Security system does not finance personal cosmetic enhancement projects or periods of absence arising from procedures performed outside the public healthcare system where no illness or accident exists.
Nevertheless, particular situations must be distinguished, including complications or pathological conditions arising as secondary effects of a procedure that was initially voluntary and cosmetic. Where the resulting health impairment is sufficiently serious, requires medical care and causes an effective inability to work, it may give rise to protected temporary incapacity.
In this case, the claimant had undergone cosmetic breast augmentation surgery in 2002. More than twenty years later, she developed right-sided mastalgia triggered by arm movement, together with signs of deterioration of the implants: intracapsular rupture in the right breast and periprosthetic fluid in the left breast. Those circumstances led to surgery to replace the implants, followed by prescribed rest and functional limitations.
The Court held that this amounted to a pathological complication secondary to the original implantation, which had developed clinically significant effects and made surgery necessary. It therefore went beyond the scope of mere cosmetic preference.
On this basis, the High Court of Justice of Aragon partially upheld the application for revision of the established facts to include the reference to mastalgia and held that the surgery and subsequent recovery period arose from a common illness (enfermedad común) requiring appropriate medical care and preventing the employee from working within the meaning of Article 169 LGSS.
The Court therefore overturned the first-instance judgment and recognised the employee’s entitlement to temporary incapacity benefit for the period of medical leave. The mutual insurance entity (mutua) was ordered to pay the benefit, with the employer bearing the applicable financial responsibility between the fourth and fifteenth days of absence and the INSS bearing subsidiary liability in the event that the mutual insurance entity became insolvent.
High Court of Justice of Aragon (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Aragón), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 554/2026 of 17 July 2026 (Appeal No. 375/2026).
13. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY (TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DEL PAÍS VASCO)
The absence of working-time records does not reverse the burden of proof for overtime where a fixed working schedule has been agreed.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ The absence of records does not automatically reverse the burden of proof. Where a fixed working schedule has been agreed, the employee must provide reasonable evidence indicating that additional hours were worked.
■ The predetermined schedule provides an evidential benchmark. A claim requires evidence that work was carried out outside the agreed days and hours.
■ Without evidence, no entitlement arises. As neither excess working time nor the conditions required by the applicable collective agreement were established, the claims for overtime, allowances and transport supplement were rejected.
The employee, who was engaged as a driver-mechanic by a road transport company and was subject to the applicable sectoral collective agreement, had a fixed working schedule of 20 hours per week and produced no specific evidence that he had worked longer hours.
In the absence of a specific Spanish statutory rule governing the evidential consequences of working-time records, the general rules on the burden of proof apply, interpreted in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment of 14 May 2019 (C-55/18) and Spanish domestic case law.
Under this approach, where a fixed working schedule has previously been established, the absence of working-time records does not automatically shift to the employer the burden of proving compliance with the agreed working schedule. The employee must first provide reasonable evidence indicating that working time exceeded the agreed schedule.
Where a record exists and satisfies the requirements of objectivity, reliability and accessibility, however, the information contained in it benefits from a presumption of accuracy, and the party challenging that information bears the burden of rebutting it.
The judgment emphasises that where a regular predetermined working schedule has been established, there is already a legal benchmark defining the days and hours during which services are to be provided. In such circumstances, the evidential issue is whether work was carried out outside that schedule. The burden of proving overtime therefore rests with the employee claiming it.
Working-time records assume greater significance where evidence indicates that the agreed schedule was not respected. However, their mere absence cannot automatically operate in the employee’s favour where there is no such evidential basis.
Applying that approach, the Court found that the employee had a fixed 20-hour weekly schedule and had produced no specific evidence that he worked beyond it. The overtime claim was therefore dismissed.
The same reasoning applied to subsistence allowances, entitlement to which required the circumstances specified in the applicable collective agreement to be established, and to the transport supplement, which was payable only where the employee was exceptionally required to start work at a time when normal public transport was unavailable. Since neither excess working time nor those specific circumstances were proven, those remuneration claims were also dismissed.
The dissenting opinion nevertheless highlights the tension between this approach and EU law, arguing that the employer’s failure to comply with its obligation to maintain working-time records should operate against the employer and improve the employee’s evidential position.
According to the dissenting judge, requiring the employee to provide evidence in these circumstances reproduces the evidential difficulty that Directive 2003/88 and CJEU case law seek to prevent. The dissent also draws an analogy with the reversal of the burden of proof in fundamental rights proceedings, where an employer’s breach of its protective obligations should not become a procedural advantage for the party in breach.
High Court of Justice of the Basque Country (Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 1636/2026 of 6 July 2026 (Appeal No. 794/2026).
14. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY (TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DEL PAÍS VASCO)
An employee accused of transferring confidential information succeeds in having her dismissal declared null and void because the company’s IT investigation infringed her fundamental right to privacy.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ Limits on employer monitoring. An exhaustive examination of the company computer and corporate email account, without adequate safeguards or defined limits, infringes privacy and the confidentiality of communications.
■ Tainted evidence and null and void dismissal. Unlawfully obtained evidence cannot serve as the basis for disciplinary dismissal, even where the employee acknowledged certain accesses; compensation for non-material damage was reduced to EUR 7,501.
■ No discrimination based on family relationship. The majority rejected this as an independent ground of nullity; the dissenting opinion considered that there was evidence of retaliation and would have maintained the EUR 15,000 award.
The disciplinary dismissal of a strategy and business development analyst at an insurance company, accused of accessing confidential commercial information and sending it to her partner, who worked for a competing entity, was declared null and void because the company infringed her fundamental rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications when investigating her company computer. The High Court of Justice of the Basque Country upheld the finding of nullity at first instance but reduced the compensation for non-material damage to EUR 7,501.
The reasoning begins by defining the limits of the employer’s monitoring powers and determining how far those powers may extend without unlawfully intruding into an employee’s private sphere. In this case, the principal source of evidence was held to have been unlawfully obtained: the company conducted an exhaustive examination of the employee’s computer and corporate email account without adequate safeguards, without the involvement of employee representatives or the employee herself, and accessed desktop folders, emails and other material without appropriate temporal limits or a strict connection with her professional activity.
The investigation was considered disproportionate and in breach of the confidentiality of communications and the employee’s right to privacy. The evidence obtained was therefore tainted and the termination decision was rendered null and void.
The judgment emphasises that, even though the employee acknowledged certain instances of accessing and downloading information, an employer cannot base a disciplinary dismissal on an investigative procedure that excessively intrudes into the employee’s private sphere.
The Court referred to Spanish constitutional case law concerning so-called «informational self-determination» (libertad informática), understood as the right to control the use of personal data and to object to its use for purposes other than those that justified its collection. The broad and unrestricted examination of the company device, including access to emails sent to the employee’s partner, was regarded as an unconstitutional interference that prevented the resulting evidence from forming a lawful basis for disciplinary action.
As regards the alleged discrimination based on family relationship, the majority rejected this as a separate ground of nullity. The Court noted that family relationship is expressly included as a ground of discrimination in the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET), although it is not expressly listed in Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution or Law 15/2022. It concluded that the principal reason for dismissal was the alleged improper access to and transfer of confidential information, conduct that could have involved any third party and was not inherently dependent on the family relationship.
By contrast, the dissenting opinion considered that the timing between the husband’s promotion at the competing company and the immediate intensive investigation of the employee provided sufficient prima facie evidence of retaliation based on family relationship. In the dissenting judge’s view, this should also have supported a finding of discriminatory dismissal and the original EUR 15,000 award should have been upheld.
Ultimately, the majority upheld the nullity of the dismissal (despido nulo) on the grounds of infringement of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications, reduced the non-material damages award to EUR 7,501 and rejected discrimination based on family relationship as an independent ground of nullity, contrary to the position taken in the dissenting opinion.
High Court of Justice of the Basque Country (Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 2111/2026 of 29 September 2026 (Appeal No. 1258/2026).
15. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF CATALONIA (TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE JUSTICIA DE CATALUÑA)
The requirement to work 90 days per year and the loss of an attendance bonus for periods of sick leave exceeding five days are null and void on grounds of discrimination.
THREE KEY TAKEAWAYS
■ The 90-day threshold is discriminatory. Requiring employees to work 90 days per year in order to qualify for the attendance bonus disadvantages short-term temporary employees and is not objectively justified.
■ The bonus rewards attendance, not the duration of the contract. The minimum-days-worked requirement bears no relationship to absence levels, which are the stated purpose of the bonus.
■ Sick leave due to common illness. Losing one twelfth of the annual bonus for a period of sick leave exceeding five days constitutes a discriminatory attendance condition based on illness under Spanish Law 15/2022.
The UGT trade union section at the public-sector company Sistema d’Emergències Mèdiques challenged, under Article 163 of the Labour Jurisdiction Act (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Social, LRJS), Article 47 of the Seventh Collective Agreement, which regulates the «special attendance bonus» (paga extraordinaria de asistencia). Specifically, it challenged paragraph 4, which requires a minimum of 90 days worked per calendar year, and the final part of paragraph 5, which provides for loss of the monthly portion of the bonus where a period of sick leave due to common illness exceeds five days.
CCOO joined the claim, the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Fiscal) supported it and the company opposed it.
The Court first rejected the company’s objection that the procedure used was inappropriate. The claim did not seek an interpretation of the collective agreement but rather a declaration that two of its provisions were unlawful and null and void, which falls within the proper scope of proceedings challenging collective agreements under Spanish procedural law.
In relation to paragraph 4, the Court referred to Clause 4 of Directive 1999/70/EC, Article 15.6 of the Spanish Workers’ Statute (ET), and Spanish Constitutional Court and Supreme Court case law concerning equal treatment between temporary and permanent employees.
The Court identified an obvious difference in treatment: permanent employees satisfy the requirement simply by maintaining their employment relationship, whereas temporary employees engaged to provide cover, taking into account the applicable 24-hour and 12-hour shifts, require relatively lengthy engagements to reach 90 working days. This amounts to direct or, alternatively, indirect discrimination within the meaning of Article 6.1 of Spanish Law 15/2022.
The difference in treatment was not objectively justified. The stated purpose of the bonus is to encourage attendance, pursuant to Article 47.1 of the Collective Agreement, rather than to encourage longer periods of employment. A temporary employee may attend work on every day for which he or she is engaged and still fail to reach the 90-day threshold.
The Court further observed that making an attendance reward conditional on a minimum number of days worked suggests an intention to exclude short-term temporary employees. It also rejected the argument that annulment of the provision would undermine the nature of the bonus or require the entirety of Article 47 to be set aside, since paragraph 5, requiring no absence during the relevant month, continues to link entitlement directly to attendance.
As regards paragraph 5, the Court applied the Spanish Supreme Court’s approach in Judgments Nos. 159/2026 and 619/2026. Protection against discrimination on grounds of illness does not require remuneration to continue during temporary incapacity. However, it is unlawful for periods of temporary incapacity, including those resulting from common contingencies (contingencias comunes), to operate so as to exclude an employee from an incentive linked to continued employment, attendance or absence levels.
Here, the provision was clearly an attendance clause rather than a rule providing for the pro rata accrual of salary. It did not state that the bonus would not accrue during the days of sick leave. Instead, a period of sick leave lasting six days was sufficient to cause the employee to lose the entire monthly portion.
The Court also rejected the company’s argument seeking to distinguish between the wording «up to and including the fifth day» and the rule applying to periods of sick leave exceeding five days. The «supplement» was the attendance bonus itself, rather than the Spanish Social Security benefit, and in both circumstances the rule operated as an objective condition of eligibility.
The Court therefore upheld the claim, declared paragraph 4 and the challenged final part of paragraph 5 of Article 47 unlawful and null and void, maintained the validity of the remainder of the provision, and ordered that the judgment be notified to the labour authority and published in the Official Gazette of the Government of Catalonia (DOGC). The judgment may be appealed on points of law (recurso de casación) before the Social Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court.
High Court of Justice of Catalonia (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña), Social Chamber. Judgment No. 4921/2026 of 23 September 2026 (Appeal No. 37/2026).
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